With intangible assets representing at least one third of U.S. corporate assets and one half of annual investment, it is important to understand to what extent intangible assets support debt. Some characteristics of intangible assets, such as high valuation risk and poor collateralizability, can discourage debt financing. Yet, intangible assets can generate cash flows just as reliably as tangible assets and may therefore support debt like tangible assets do. The empirical capital structure research has struggled to quantify the effects of intangible assets on leverage because most intangible assets are not reflected in financial statements. We take advantage of a recent accounting rule change that has made it possible to observe market-based valuations of a large part of intangible assets that beforehand where largely unobservable. With this novel dataset, we find a strong positive relation between intangible assets and financial leverage. The strength of this relation depends on the type of firm. In firms with ample tangible assets, the tangible assets can support the desired debt and intangible assets do not affect leverage. In firms with limited tangible assets, intangible assets strongly affect leverage and are the primary support of debt. On a per dollar basis across all firms, intangible assets support roughly three quarters as much debt financing as tangible assets. We also observe that the type of debt financing differs for firms whose assets are predominantly intangible. Firms with higher proportions of intangible assets utilize more unsecured and convertible debt, debt types that fit an intangible asset base well.
I. Introduction
It has long been recognized that intangible assets can be critically important to firm value and potentially affect firms' financial policies. However, heretofore it has been difficult to assess their importance since their values are largely unobservable. For example, firms' R&D expenditures are expensed and usually do not find their way onto the firms' balance sheets. In this study, we focus on the relation between intangible assets and financial leverage. Our main goal is to document to what extent intangible assets support debt. Are intangible assets, due to characteristics such as high valuation risk and poor collateralizability, unable to support debt? Or do intangible assets support debt like tangible assets do? We answer these questions with a novel dataset that for the first time offers comprehensive accounts of the values of firms' intangible assets.
The capital structure research has struggled to empirically quantify the effects of intangible assets on leverage. The problem lies in accounting rules that distinguish between two types of intangible assets: those that are acquired externally, through transactions such as mergers and acquisitions, and those that are self-created internally. The self-created intangible assets, essentially all intangible assets that the firm did not acquire externally, are not reflected in financial statements, due to the conservatism tradition in accounting and the difficulty, cost, and effort associated with valuing intangible assets. 1 Instead, the costs associated with creating these intangible assets are generally expensed. As the quote from The Economist (2014a) above implies, the self-created intangible assets frequently include items of substantial value, such as brand names, trademarks, patents, developed technology, in-process research and development, and Express' list of customers' identities, spending patterns, and creditworthiness. For these intangible assets, researchers usually cannot even observe book values, not to mention market or fair values.
The only exception are sporadic estimates like the ones The Economist (2014a, 2014b) refers to.
Our study circumvents this data problem by taking advantage of a recent accounting rule change that allows us to observe fair values of self-created intangible assets for a subset of firms.
For mergers and acquisitions since 2001, acquirers must allocate the purchase prices they pay for targets to the tangible and identifiable intangible assets they acquire, and the remainder to goodwill. 2 Acquirers must report these allocations that provide us with fair market value estimates of the targets' tangible and identifiable intangible assets, including those intangible assets that are self-created by the targets. We take these estimates of targets' tangible and intangible assets and relate them to the targets' pre-acquisition financial leverage. 3 1 According to the Wall Street Journal (2016) , "the FASB [Financial Accounting Standards Board] hasn't been able to find a solution in which benefits of reporting intangibles outweigh the costs." 2 For ease of exposition, we refer to "identifiable intangible assets" simply as "intangible assets" when the meaning is clear in the context. 3 Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) also examine financial leverage in a mergers and acquisitions setting.
Note that our measures of tangible and intangible assets differ primarily along two dimensions from the prior capital structure research, where tangibility is commonly defined as property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. We use fair market value estimates instead of book values, and we separate intangible assets into identifiable intangible assets and goodwill.
Prior studies usually find a positive relation between tangibility and leverage, implying a negative relation between intangible assets (scaled by total assets) and leverage if everything that is not property, plant, or equipment is considered an intangible asset. Because we independently observe tangible assets and identifiable intangible assets, there is no such mechanical relation in our paper.
Goodwill, i.e., all unidentifiable intangible assets, is the third component of firm value in our study that adds a degree of freedom so that the coefficients on tangible assets and identifiable intangible assets are not forced to have opposite signs.
While it has been challenging to assess the relation between intangible assets and leverage, it is well known that firms with more tangible assets tend to have more debt. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. One reason is that many tangible assets constitute suitable collateral (Harris and Raviv 1991; Frank and Goyal 2008; Parsons and Titman 2009) because they can more easily be redeployed at relatively low transaction costs when the borrower defaults or becomes distressed. Tangible assets also tend to be less risky and easier to value than intangible assets. Therefore, borrowing costs should be relatively low when tangible assets support firms' debt, resulting in a positive relation between asset tangibility and financial leverage. 4 As in the prior literature, firms with high levels of tangibility have on average high financial leverage in our sample. Our new and interesting finding is that firms' use of financial leverage is also positively related to identifiable intangible assets and that this relation is both statistically significant and economically large. Moreover, there are differences based on asset tangibility. In firms with ample tangible assets, the tangible assets can support the desired debt and intangible assets do not affect leverage. In firms with limited tangible assets, however, intangible assets augment, and even substitute for, tangible assets in the role they play in determining leverage and supporting debt. Therefore, our findings are an extension of, not a replacement for, the established leverage-tangibility results.
Our most important contribution to the literature is that we can quantify the effect of intangible assets on debt levels. Quantifying this effect has been largely impossible in the existing research that primarily analyzes imprecise proxies for intangible assets, for example patents, instead of the actual intangible assets. We show that the quantitative impact of intangible assets is substantial as the coefficient estimates of intangible assets are similar to those of tangible assets in our leverage regressions. In dollar terms, one dollar of tangible assets supports $0.21 of debt while one dollar of intangible assets supports $0.16 of debt, on average.
The results suggest that intangible assets can support debt well because they support the servicing and repayment of debt, and some intangible assets can potentially serve as collateral.
Many intangible assets are apparently good at generating cash flows. Consequently, they can support substantial debt amounts and leverage. In conversations, bankers confirmed to us that their main criterion in deciding on the amount and type of debt is the firm's capacity to pay back the debt and to make the interest payments, frequently without regard to the tangibility of the firm's assets. 5 These insights are vital because intangible assets play an increasingly important role in today's knowledge-based economy. Nakamura (2001, 2003) estimates that a third of the value of U.S. corporate assets are intangible assets. Furthermore, the annual investment rate in intangible assets in the U.S. is $1 trillion as of 2001, practically equal to that in tangible assets according to Nakamura's analysis. In 2014, the investment rate in intangible assets represented 14% of private sector gross domestic product compared to 10% in tangible assets according to the Wall Street Journal (2016).
Further corroborating our main result, we find that the relative prevalence of tangible and intangible assets is associated with the firms' types of debt. Firms with relatively few tangible assets are likely riskier borrowers. Correspondingly, these firms tend to have debt with features that better protect the lenders from risk, such as relatively shorter maturities, more term loans, more bank debt, more convertible debt, less unsecured debt, and less fixed-rate debt. 6 Our results suggest that the focus of the existing empirical capital structure literature on tangibility, necessitated by data availability, can lead to misspecified, incomplete, and potentially misleading estimations. As a case in point, one result in Rauh and Sufi (2010) is that tangibility does not help explain the fraction of bank debt in total book capital. This finding is not surprising because, as we show, bank debt is particularly prevalent in firms where intangible assets constitute relatively high proportions of firm value, and the usual measures of tangibility do not reflect differing amounts of intangible assets.
Our focus, the relation between intangible assets and leverage, has long been recognized theoretically, 7 but has been difficult to examine empirically. Titman and Wessels (1988) use the ratio of intangibles to total assets as a proxy for the collateralizability of a firm's assets and find a negative relation between this ratio and leverage. However, likely because they are not reported in financial statements, their measure of intangibles does not include self-created intangible assets that arose, for example, out of the firm's own R&D or brand management efforts, but does include goodwill which is difficult to interpret. Mann (2015) uses patents as a proxy for intangible assets and finds that court decisions that enhance creditor rights in default increase the role of patents as collateral and allow patenting companies to raise more debt. Patents may be a decent proxy for intangible assets, but our intangible asset measure is much more inclusive and provides a more direct reflection of the market value of a firm's intangible assets. It is also the only measure that allows us to quantify the relation between intangible assets and debt.
II. Purchase price allocation and Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 141
Prior studies do not use intangible assets as determinants of leverage because the values of firms' self-created intangible assets are largely unobservable. We get around this data limitation with a unique dataset that takes advantage of a recent accounting rule change that requires an acquiring firm to provide more detailed fair (market) value estimates of the target firm's identifiable intangible assets. Starting in July 2001, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 141 requires that an acquiring firm allocates the purchase price paid for a target to identifiable assets, both tangible and intangible, based on estimated fair market values at the time of the acquisition, before allocating the remaining purchase price to goodwill. 8 These estimates of the market values of the tangible and intangible assets are reported in the acquirers' 10-Ks or 10-Qs 8 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) standards are now incorporated into FASB's Accounting Standards Codification (ASC), and SFAS 141 can be found under FASB ASC 805: Business Combinations. However, to be consistent with prior literature, we will refer to SFAS 141 instead of ASC 805. FASB revised SFAS 141 in 2007 and it is now called SFAS 141R. Paragraph 14 of SFAS 141R states that "The acquirer's application of the recognition principle and conditions may result in recognizing some assets and liabilities that the acquiree [target] had not previously recognized as assets and liabilities in its financial statements. For example, the acquirer recognizes the acquired identifiable intangible assets, such as a brand name, a patent, or a customer relationship, that the acquiree [target] did not recognize as assets in its financial statements because it developed them internally and charged the related costs to expense." where we, with the generous help of Houlihan Lokey, obtain them. 9 In effect, SFAS 141 provides the fair market values of target firms' identifiable intangible assets that are based on arm's length transactions. Prior to SFAS 141, acquirers allocated most of the intangible portion of the purchase price to acquisition goodwill without providing detailed valuations of identifiable intangible assets. 10 For example, Henning, Lewis, and Shaw (2000) report that, on average, 57% of the purchase price is allocated to acquisition goodwill prior to SFAS 141 while it is only 38% in our post SFAS 141 data. Like other recent papers, our study validates the usefulness of the SFAS 141based purchase price allocation data. 11 We also examine the effects on leverage of components of intangible assets. Under SFAS 141, acquirers allocate the purchase price to two main categories, tangible and intangible assets.
The intangible assets category is further divided into five categories of identifiable intangible assets and one category of unidentifiable intangible assets, i.e., acquisition goodwill. Among the identifiable intangible asset categories, two are technology-related. They are developed technology, including patents, and in-process research and development. Another two are marketing-related. They are trademarks and trade names, including domain names, and customer-9 Houlihan Lokey is a global investment banking firm founded in 1972. The firm operates through three main service lines: corporate finance (comprising mergers and acquisitions, capital markets, and second advisory), financial restructuring, and financial advisory services. For 2012, Houlihan Lokey ranked No. 1 in announced U.S. M&A deal volume for deals under $3 billion. 10 Prior to SFAS 141, the accounting for mergers and acquisitions followed Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion 16, Business Combinations. Two methods of accounting, "purchase" and "pooling of interests," were allowed under APB 16. The "pooling" method combined assets and liabilities at book value. No fair values needed to be determined and no goodwill was created. The "purchase" method valued assets and liabilities at fair value and recognized intangible assets, including goodwill. In addition to eliminating the "pooling" method, SFAS 141 clarifies how intangibles should be valued in allocating the purchase price and requires reporting details on each major intangible asset class. 11 For example, Kimbrough (2007) offers evidence that the value of intangible assets reported in the purchase price allocation provides valuable information to equity investors. Shalev, Zhang, and Zhang (2013) document that CEOs whose compensation packages rely on earnings-based bonuses are more likely to overallocate the purchase price to goodwill because it helps boosting future reported earnings thanks to the removal of mandatory amortization of goodwill under SFAS 141. related assets, including backlog, customer contracts, and customer relationships. The fifth category covers all other identifiable intangible assets.
III. Hypotheses
We develop our hypotheses by adding intangible assets as an independent variable in the context of the following standard leverage regression model:
where Lev is the long-term debt divided by total assets, Tan stands for the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, Con is a vector of control variables, Firm is a firm fixed effect, Year is a year fixed effect, i denotes a firm, and t denotes a year.
Since the fair market value of identifiable intangible assets is available only at the time when the target is acquired, the purchase price allocation data limits us to a cross-sectional analysis.
Consequently, we remove the firm fixed effects from equation 1. Due to our relatively short sample period, we include year indicators only in some regressions as robustness tests. Similarly, with our limited sample size, we add industry indicators only as robustness checks. Therefore, our main regression specification is:
where Int stands for the fair market value of intangible assets reported in the purchase price allocation data of the acquiring firms' 10-Ks or 10-Qs, normalized by the purchase price. We measure Tan in two alternative ways, either with the tangible assets from the hand-collected purchase price allocation data (i.e., fair value estimates) normalized by the purchase price or with the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (i.e., historical costs) to total assets from Compustat.
We omit goodwill from the regressions because Tan plus Int plus goodwill divided by the purchase price add up to one, i.e., we can only have two of the three variables in a regression at the same time.
It is implausible that intangible assets have a negative effect on leverage because any valuable asset should contribute at least somewhat to a firm's debt capacity. 12 Still, this positive effect can be small or even insignificant, i.e.,  should be relatively small and may be even indistinguishable from zero. There are at least three reasons why intangible assets can be unrelated to leverage. First, collateralizing intangible assets is challenging. Intangible assets tend to be more difficult to identify, separate, utilize, and value. Furthermore, repossessing intangibles in case of default or bankruptcy is difficult, and agency problems can prevent the efficient use of intangible assets in production processes by anyone other than the owners of the intangible assets (Rampini and Viswanathan 2013). Second, and partially related to the first point, intangible assets traditionally have been regarded as more risky than tangible assets. Financing risky assets with equity should be more appropriate than financing them with debt in most cases. Third, intangible assets can be unimportant because most firms have enough tangible assets to support their desired leverage.
It is also possible that intangible assets provide important, substantial backing for leverage, in particular in light of intangible assets comprising increasing proportions of many firms' values.
Assets can support debt not only because they are useful collateral, but also because they enable the firm to be profitable and generate cash. As Paul Krugman's quote at the beginning of the paper implies, many intangible assets can very effectively generate cash flows, frequently more so than tangible assets. Intangible assets that generate substantial future cash flows should be well-suited to support debt financing. Moreover, if the recent breed of intangible assets is less risky than traditional intangible assets, risk considerations may not prevent financing intangible assets with debt. Supporting this view, Larkin (2013) argues that positive consumer attitude towards a brand, an intangible asset, reduces the overall firm riskiness. She finds that firms use the higher stability provided by better brand perception to increase leverage and lower cash holdings. Furthermore, as
Loumioti (2012) reports, some intangible assets can constitute collateral. Some lenders accept liquid and redeployable intangible assets as collateral because they have found innovative ways of leveraging, financing, and valuing intangible assets. Ellis and Jarboe (2010) provide examples of such intangible asset-backed loans. Therefore, many intangible assets can support debt, i.e.,  should be significantly positive and relatively large.
IV. Data
The sample comprises 514 non-financial U.S. public firms that became targets of completed acquisitions by U.S. public acquirers between 2002 and 2014. Houlihan Lokey provides us the original dataset of 6,133 acquisitions with purchase price allocation (PPA) information that is hand-collected from 10-Ks and 10-Qs. We match the 6,133 targets with Compustat using target company names. This matching reduces the sample to 1,216 targets. Limited data availability in Compustat and the exclusion of subsidiary and foreign targets further reduce the sample size to 671 firms. 13 After excluding financial firms, our final sample consists of 514 firms.
The unique feature of our dataset is that it provides fair value estimates of tangible and intangible assets based on arms' length transactions between targets and acquirers. With these exceptional data, we examine the relation between a target's tangible and intangible assets at the time of the acquisition and the target's leverage at the last fiscal year-end before the acquisition.
The dataset has three drawbacks. First, it is limited to target firms that are successfully acquired by other firms. Firms that become targets and are eventually acquired may have unique unobservable characteristics that drive intangibles to be positively correlated with leverage.
Controlling for such biases and the endogeneity of becoming a target is difficult because we lack appropriate instruments. Yet, other evidence makes it unlikely that our findings only apply to the firms in our distinct sample. For example, our sample firms are similar along many dimensions to We first compare our sample to the Compustat universe. The first column of Table 1 and market leverage seem to decline over the four quarters prior to the last fiscal year-end before the acquisition announcement, the decline is not straight-line and of a small magnitude. In an untabulated correlation analysis, we find that the correlations among the historical R&D/ sales is negatively related to leverage supporting that research-oriented firms tend to have lower leverage. In contrast, Advertising/ sales is not significantly related to leverage. We further discuss and examine these associations in the multivariate analysis. Table 3 Table 3 are largely as expected. For example, the top four industries with the highest intangible assets are healthcare, consumer non-durables, telecommunications, and business equipment. Healthcare has the highest percentage of technology-related intangible assets followed by the business equipment industry. Consumer non-durables has the highest percentage of marketing-related intangible assets. 16 Not surprisingly, utilities have the highest tangible asset intensity.
Panel A of

V. Multivariate analysis of the relation between intangible assets and leverage
We design our multivariate tests to examine the extent to which intangible assets affect capital structure in addition to the variables already established in the literature, in particular tangible assets. More importantly, the association between Intangible assets/ PP and leverage is positive and significant in all but one of the model specifications in raises concern whether there is enough remaining variation in the sample. Particularly the industry indicators seem reduce our coefficient estimates meaningfully. Because of this concern, and the otherwise similar results with and without year and industry indicators, we omit these indicators in the remaining analyses where we frequently use subsamples that would exacerbate the problem of too many indicator variables.
A. Analysis of aggregate intangible assets
Since tangible assets, identifiable intangible assets, and goodwill as fractions of the purchase price add up to one, we can only examine two of these three items at the same time. We choose to focus our tests on tangible assets and identifiable intangible assets because our hypotheses are for these two variables. In untabulated tests, we repeat our main analyses with Firms that become targets and are eventually acquired may have unique unobservable characteristics that make their intangible assets particularly suitable to support debt. We would like to address this potential sample selection bias with an appropriate econometric method. Yet, for identification purposes, we would need variables that predict which firms become targets and end up in our sample, but that are unrelated to the leverage of target firms prior to being acquired.
We conjecture that acquirers seek targets for growth and profitability while large target size should be an impediment to becoming a target. So, we could use Assets, Profit margin, and Sales growth as instruments. However, these three variables almost certainly affect leverage and therefore are not appropriate instruments. Unfortunately, we have not found appropriate instruments and suppose that finding them is likely impossible in our case. Still, we use our inappropriate instruments in untabulated Heckman analyses and our main results remain unchanged. We acknowledge that the lack of endogeneity and selection controls limits any claims of causation.
Yet, we contend that even just the descriptive nature of our analyses provides important new insights.
B. Analysis of intangible assets components
We also separately examine the effects on leverage of the three components of identifiable Technology-related intangible assets have a positive and significant effect on leverage in all models, as do the intangible assets that are lumped together in the "other" category. 20
Marketing-related intangible assets have positive point estimates throughout, but are significant only in one out of the six estimations. Overall, Table 5 suggests that technology-related and other intangible assets are the main drivers for the significantly positive relation between intangible assets and leverage. The coefficient of Other/ PP is significantly positive for all firms and significantly higher for technology firms in both the book and the market leverage estimations. Note that we are showing Tobit estimations here because their estimates are slightly more clear-cut than the coefficients in the untabulated OLS estimations that have the same signs but differ somewhat in terms of significance levels. Overall, our results indicate that the relation between leverage and intangible assets depends on industry and the nature of the intangible assets.
C. Role of industry
D. Role of tangible asset intensity
Intangible assets should matter less for firms that have high tangible asset intensities, i.e., firms where tangible assets comprise large portions of the firms' values. Most of these firms should have sufficient tangible assets to support all the debt they desire, making it unnecessary for intangible assets to back debt. We test this conjecture by running our regressions separately for firms with high and low tangible asset intensities. Table 7 presents analyses of subsamples of firms with high or low tangible asset intensities.
We classify the tangible asset intensity as high if the tangible assets are in the top tercile of the ratio of tangible assets to total purchase price (the other two components of the purchase price allocation are identifiable intangible assets and acquisition goodwill), and as low otherwise. 21 The resulting threshold for high asset tangibility is 0.45, i.e., tangible assets comprising 45% or more of the total purchase price. 22 The dependent variable is Book leverage in models 1 and 2 and Market leverage in models 3 and 4. We use the same controls as in Table 4 .
We find that intangible assets have significantly positive associations with leverage in the low tangible asset intensity subsample while the coefficients are insignificant in the high tangible 21 Since we use the fair value-based Tangible assets/ PP to split the sample, we include historical cost-based PPE/ assets as the tangibility measure in the subsample estimations. Note that PPE should be a subset of Tangible assets.
Results are similar if we include Tangible assets/ PP. 22 Results are robust to using a threshold of 0.5. asset intensity subsample. Untabulated results indicate that TRI/ PP and OI/ PP primarily drive the results, but that MRI/ PP also has a significant relation with Book leverage when the tangible asset intensity is low. 23 Overall, the results in Table 7 demonstrate that intangible assets support debt in particular for firms with low tangible asset intensities. Firms with high tangible asset intensities seem to have sufficient tangible assets to support debt to make intangible assets unimportant in their leverage decisions.
E. Quantifying debt supported by tangible and intangible assets
Next, we quantify the debt supported by tangible and intangible assets. Table 8 shows that 23 The results in all models are robust to including R&D/sales and Advertising/sales as additional control variables.
both tangible and intangible assets support debt. On average, on a per dollar basis, intangible assets support about three quarters as much debt as tangible assets.
F. Additional robustness tests
In Table 9 , we split our sample approximately in half by announcement year. For both book and market leverage, the coefficients on Intangible assets/ PP are larger and substantially more significant in the latter part of the sample period from 2008 to 2014 than in the earlier part from 2002 to 2007. There are no systematic changes in the coefficients of Tangible assets/ PP between the two time periods. A possible explanation for these findings is that as intangible assets continue to become more important, their effects on capital structure become more pronounced.
Furthermore, it is comforting that we get generally consistent results after splitting the sample in half.
We conjecture that intangible assets should have a larger impact on capital structure for firms that more efficiently turn R&D and advertising into sales. The reason is that ultimately intangible assets can only support debt if they help generate cash. In Table 10, out to be less valuable than expected. Short-term and bank debt usually allows the lender to scrutinize the borrower more frequently and more in-depth, and to more timely adjust lending terms.
G. Type of debt and debt maturity supported by intangible assets
In Panel B, we assess whether the tangible asset intensity is related to debt maturities. The measures for debt maturity are (i) the ratio of debt in current liabilities (DLC in Compustat) to total long-term debt (DLC/ DLTT), (ii) the ratio of long-term debt due in next year (DD1) to total longterm debt, (iii) the ratio of long-term debt due in the next three years (DD1+DD2+DD3) to total long-term debt, and (iv) the ratio of long-term debt due in the next five years (DD1+DD2+DD3+DD4+DD5) to total long-term debt. Firms with lower asset tangibility are more likely to have shorter-term debt, i.e., debt maturing within the next five years. Shorter-term debt is well-suited for riskier and less transparent borrowers. Again, it appears that intangible assets tend to support different types of debt than tangible assets. In sum, firms and their lenders seem to rationally choose debt types that are best aligned with the tangible or intangible nature of the firms' assets.
VI. Conclusion
We show empirically that intangible assets have a robust positive relation with leverage even though these intangible assets are generally not reported in firms' financial statements and regulatory filings, with the exception of our subsample of firms that were subsequently acquired.
On average, one dollar of intangible assets supports approximately three quarters as much debt as one dollar of tangible assets. Intangible assets have the strongest effect on leverage in technology firms and in firms with low tangible asset intensities. Consistent with the nature of intangible assets, the level of asset tangibility affects the debt type and its maturity. Our paper's main innovation is that it circumvents the near impossibility (for outsiders) of estimating the market value of a firm's intangible assets by using a novel dataset that became available after a recent accounting rule change. While the dataset can only provide market value-based estimates of intangible assets for a small subset of firms, it is the first such dataset that allows a direct empirical examination of the relation between intangible assets and financial leverage. With the novel data, our study is the first that is able to quantify the relation of intangible assets and debt financing.
Our results are important for the empirical research on the capital structure because they are likely applicable to many, if not most, firms and they confirm that intangible assets are one of the primary determinants of capital structure. 
(a) Sorrento Networks Corporation
In July 2004, the Company completed the acquisition of Sorrento Networks Corporation in exchange for total consideration of $98.0 million, consisting of common stock valued at $57.7 million, options and warrants to purchase common stock valued at $12.3 million, assumed liabilities of $27.0 million, and acquisition costs of $1.0 million. The Company acquired Sorrento to obtain its line of optical transport products and enhance its competitive position with cable operators. One of the Company's directors is a partner of a venture capital firm which is a significant stockholder of Zhone, and which also held warrants to purchase Sorrento common stock that were assumed by Zhone.
The purchase consideration was allocated to the fair values of the assets acquired as follows: net tangible assets-$23.4 million, amortizable intangible assets-$14.8 million, purchased inprocess research and development-$2.4 million, goodwill-$57.2 million and deferred compensation-$0.2 million. The amount allocated to purchased in-process research and development was charged to expense during the third quarter of 2004, because technological feasibility had not been established and no future alternative uses for the technology existed. The estimated fair value of the purchased in-process research and development was determined using a discounted cash flow model, based on a discount rate which took into consideration the stage of completion and risks associated with developing the technology. Of the amount allocated to amortizable intangible assets, $9.2 million was allocated to core technology, which is being amortized over an estimated useful life of five years. The remaining $5.6 million was allocated to customer relationships, which is being amortized over an estimated useful life of four years.
Appendix A.2
Acquirer: K2 Inc. Target: Brass Eagle, Inc. The Brass Eagle transaction was accounted for under the purchase method of accounting; and, accordingly, the purchased assets and liabilities assumed were recorded at their estimated fair values at the date of the merger. The following table summarizes the total purchase price, estimated fair values of the assets acquired and liabilities assumed, and the resulting net intangible assets acquired at the date of the acquisition: 
